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THE LIABILITY OF A MANUFACTURER OR VENDOR
TO PERSONS OTHER THAN THE IMMEDIATE
VENDEES IN MISSOURI
The liability of a manufacturer or vendor to persons other
than his immediate vendee has been the subject of much com-
Inent and criticism.' Most writers have been concerned with the
failure of the courts to take cognizance of certain basic economic
changes which have occurred since the early precedents were
established. Some writers have stressed the inconsistency, dis-
sension and lack of harmony in this body of law.2 Others have
directed their attention primarily to the use of legal fictions by
which some courts have been able, rather dubiously, to circum-
vent outmoded precedents.3 But the tenor of all of the writings
has been that this branch of the law does not adequately and
realistically conform to the present day methods of advertising,
merchandising and marketing. To determine to what extent this
is true in Missouri, if at all, is the purpose and scope of this
article.
LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
The general rule of law concerning the liability of a manu-
facturer or vendor to third persons is considered to be derived
from the holding in the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright.4
In that case the defendant entered into a contract with the Post-
master-General whereby the defendant agreed to provide and to
keep in good repair coaches for the carrying of the mail. The
plaintiff, a mail coach driver, stated in his declaration that the
defendant had negligently failed to perform his contract to keep
the coaches in good repair, that one of the coaches broke down
1. Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than Their
Immediate Vendees, 45 L. Q. REV. 343 (1929); Feezer, Tort Liability of
Manufacfurers and Vendors, 10 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1925); Feezer, Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REV. 752 (1935); Jeanblanc,
Manufacturers Liability to Persons Other than Their Immediate Vendees,
24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937); Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ulti-
mate Consumer, 21 KY. L. J. 388 (1933). Note, 22 WAsH. L. REv. 406
(1932).
2. Russell, supra note 1.
3. Jeanblanc, supra note 1.
4. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402.
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while he was driving it, and that as a result of the defendant's
failure to perform the contract the plaintiff was injured. Re-
covery was denied by the court, Lord Abinger saying:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person
passing along the road who was injured by the upsetting of
the coach might bring a similar action. Unless we confine
the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most outrageous consequences to
which I can see no limit, would ensue5
The above cited case has since been treated as the leading case
for the proposition that a manufacturer or vendor, though negli-
gent, is not liable for an injury to a third person when no privity
of contract exists as to such persons. This principle was recog-
nized in the early Missouri case of Heizer v. Kingsnd and
Douglass Mfg. Co.,6 where the plaintiff was the widow of an
employee hired to operate a threshing machine. Ellis, the em-
ployer, had purchased the machine from the defendant and dur-
ing the course of normal threshing operations, the cylinder on
the machine broke into pieces and killed the plaintiff's husband.
In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff the court said:
The plaintiff's evidence tends to show that the iron in the
heads and bands of the cylinder was of a poor quality, that
there was want of care in testing the pieces of iron beforejoined into the cylinder and perhaps want of care in testing
the machine when completed; but all this does not show that
the defendant knew this cylinder was defective or unfit for
use. The case discloses no motive whatever on the part of
the defendant for sending out a defective machine. The
plaintiff's case tends to show no more than negligence, and
an action based on that ground must be confined to the
immediate parties to the contract by which the machine was
sold.7
As late as 1924 this case was cited and relied upon as con-
trolling, the court in Tipton v. Barnard and Leas Mfg. Co.. hold-
ing that notwithstanding the negligence of the defendant, lia-
bility would not extend to a third person unless the defendant
-had knowledge of the defect.8 These two cases show very clearly
that, up to 1924 at least, the basic ingredient of a tort action
for negligence by a third party against a manufacturer was the
5. 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405.
6. 110 Mo. 605, 19 S. W. 630 (1892).
7. Id. at 617, 19 S. W. at 633.
8. 302 Mo. 162, 257 S. W. 791 (1924).
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element of fraud But as of today, a study of the cases seems
to indicate that their value as precedent is limited to cases in-
volving vendors.0
The case of MeLeod v. Linde Air Products Co." is the leading
Missouri case involving the tort liability of a manufacturer or
vendor to third persons. In that case the defendant manufac-
tured and sold oxygen to the plaintiff's father for welding pur-
poses. It was delivered in steel tanks charged to a pressure of
1800 lbs. to the square inch. On the top of each tank was a brass
valve for the release of the oxygen which, in the instant case, was
defective and failed to discharge the oxygen when opened. The
employee who was trying to make use of the oxygen then con-
cluded that the tank was empty, and left the valve standing open.
Suddenly the oxygen shot forth in an explosive manner, causing
the tank to topple over and strike a steel table which chipped off
a piece of a brass coupling attached to the valve, driving it with
great force into the skull of the plaintiff, a small boy who was
standing about eight feet away. The plaintiff pleaded specific
negligence and the defendant demurred to the plaintiff's evi-
dence. On the appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, the de-
fendant argued that a manufacturer or vendor is not liable to
third parties unless the article which causes the injury is a thing
which is inherently dangerous. This had been a widely recog-
nized exception to the general rule since Thomas v. Winchester,"'
where the court held a defendant drug manufacturer liable to a
remote purchaser for mislabeling a poisonous drug as a harmless
medicine. In sustaining the judgment for the plaintiff, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri not only refused to follow its decision
three years previous in the Tipton case, but proceeded to bring
the law of Missouri up to date by adopting three exceptions to
the general rule of the Winterbottom case:
(1) Where the negligent act is imminently dangerous and
is committed in the preparation or sale of an article intended
to preserve, destroy or affect human life.
(2) Where the act is that of an owner combined with an
9. Martin v. Maxwell-Brisco Motor Vehicle Co., 158 Mo. App. 188, 138
S. W. 65 (1911).
10. Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co., 111 S. W. 2d 66 (Mo. 1937).
11. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S. W. 2d 122
(1927).
12. 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
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invitation to the party thereby injured to use the defective
appliance on such owner's premises.
(3) Where the act consists in the sale and delivery of an
article with knowledge of undisclosed danger and without
notice of its qualities, whereby any person is injured in a
way that might reasonably have been expected.13
These three exceptions were not original, but it was the first
time that they had found expression in a Missouri case. The
ground for the decision and the real significance of the principal
case was the extension of the first exception to the general rule.
The expression as found in the opinion is:
The early cases limited exception one to things in their
nature destructive such as poisons, explosives and deadly
weapons. We think the exception should be extended to in-
clude "a thing which when applied to its intended use be-
comes dangerous," although not inherently so. There is no
reason why the principle should not apply to things immi-
nently dangerous whether inherently so or not."
Since that date the great majority of tort actions against
manufacturers have been brought on facts falling within excep-
tion number one as extended by the MoLeod case; the cause of
action arose out of an injury suffered because of a defective
chattel which, though not inherently dangerous, became immi-
nently dangerous, because of the defect, when put to its intended
use. In one of these later actions the rule laid down in the
Heizen and Tipton cases was held to be no longer controlling."
In another it was decided that a person who modified a product
of nature slightly thereby became a manufacturer of it.20 No
further judicial legislation or extension of the manufacturer's
or vendor's liability has been found.
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The most consistent and perhaps the most important ground
for contention in these cases has been over the application of
the res ips loquitvr doctrine. Obviously if the doctrine is closely
restricted in its application the possibility of a recovery is like-
13. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 403, 1 S. W. 2d
122, 124 (1927). Cf. Hussett v. J. I. Case Threbsing Mach. Co., 120 Fed.
865 (8th Cir. 1903).
14. McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., supra note 13, at 406.
15. Jacobs v. Adams Electric Co., 97 S. W. 2d 849 (Mo. 1936).
16. McCormick v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 235 Mo. App.
612, 144 S. W. 2d 866 (1940) (bamboo vaulting pole taped and painted).
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wise limited and liability of the manufacturer or vendor pro-
portionately lessened. The converse of this would, of course,
indirectly tend to extend such liability.
It seems to be settled law in Missouri that an injury suffered
by the explosion of a beverage bottle is a proper case for the
application of res ipsa loquitur.27 As regards a latent defect in
other types of chattels, the courts have just as consistently denied
the plaintiff the aid of the doctrine.
In one case,", the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that
mere proof of a latent defect does not, of and by itself, cast the
liability upon the defendant manufacturer unless the defendant
has had an opportunity to discover such defect; and further,
that it becomes a mere matter of conjecture whether the de-
fendant used due care in manufacturing and testing the article
unless the defendant has the right to control the article after it
has passed into the hands of the plaintiff 9
Contra is a case where the plaintiff was allowed to recover on
a charge of specific negligence by merely proving that an abra-
sive grinding wheel flew to pieces, injuring him while he was
exercising due care, and that the wheel was subjected to a normal
operating use only.20 From this set of facts the Supreme Court
said the jury could reasonably draw two inferences. First, from
the fact that the abrasive wheel flew to pieces under a normal
operating use, the jury could infer that it contained a latent
defect. Second, from the fact that the defect existed in the
wheel, the jury could infer that the defendant had failed to make
a reasonable test to discover it.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
The rule laid down in the Heizer and Tipton cases no longer
governs the liability of a manufacturer, but since the liability of
a vendor is generally more limited than that of a manufacturer,
17. Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, 206 Mo. App. 246, 227
S. W. 631 (1921); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W.
497 (1925); Counts v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 149 S. W. 2d
418 (Mo. 1941).
18. Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 342 Mo. 912, 119 S. W. 2d
240 (1938).
19. Cf. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., and Rendlen Motor Co., 350
Mo. 431, 166 S. W. 2d 575 (1943) (defective automobile brakes).
20. Zersch v. The Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia and Production Tool
and Supply Co., 353 Mo. 558, 183 S. W. 2d 140 '(1944).
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that rule may be applied to exempt the former from liability
under circumstances where the latter would be held accountable.21
It is to be noted that the decision in the McLeod case extends
the liability of the manufacturer not only to remote vendees, but
also to innocent bystanders. This rule is both liberal and just.
Tort liability in general is founded on the breach of a duty im-
posed by law not to expose others to a foreseeable and unreason-
able risk of harn and there is no apparent reason today why a
manufacturer or vendor should be put in a class immune to such
liability.
With the exception of the beverage bottle cases, it would seem
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is denied a plaintiff unless
the defendant has the right to control the instrumentality at the
time the injury occurs. Such a restriction on the use of the doc-
trine makes it available only in very rare instances. The better
rule would seem to require only that the defendant had the right
to control the instrumentality at the time the alleged negligence
of manufacturing or testing occurred.
A plaintiff can, however, allege specific negligence on the part
of the defendant and by proving the existence of the latent de-
fect and the use of due care on his own part, make a case suffi-
cient to go to the jury and to sustain a verdict.2 2 Thus it would
seem that the law of Missouri allows a plaintiff to recover on a
charge of specific negligence with no more proof than would be
,required in* setting up a res ipsa case. Conclusions which are
termed "conjectural" if the plaintiff has attempted to recover on
a res ipsa. case imperceptibly become "logical inferences" if the
plaintiff has pleaded specific negligence.
LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
A warranty in a sale of goods is not one of the essential
elements of the contract, for a sale is none the less complete
and perfect in the absence of a warranty. But it is a col-
lateral undertaking, forming part of the contract by the
agreement of the parties express or implied.23 ... It further
follows, and such is the general rule of law, that no war-
ranty of the quality of a chattel is to be implied from the
mere fact of sale.24
21. Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co., 111 S. W. 2d 66 (Mo. 1937).
22. See note 20 supra.
23. BENsAmIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE SALE OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY 564 (2d ed. 1877).
24. BENYAMXN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 565.
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Even where an express warranty and reliance on it can be
found, such a warranty cannot generally be the basis of an action
by a third person because the warranty is a part of the contract
and the liability thereon is limited to the parties to the contract. 5
A number of courts, however, have shown their ingenuity in
circumventing these established precedents by applying legal fic-
tions which have made it possible for a third party to recover on
the breach of an implied warranty.26 A noteworthy example in
the state of Missouri is the case of Madouros v. Kansas City
Coca Cola Bottling Co. 2 7 In that case the plaintiff purchased a
bottle of Coca Cola from one Gus Paulos to whom it had been
delivered by the defendant. The plaintiff took two or three swal-
lows from the bottle and immediately became violently ill. One
of the plaintiff's witnesses then examined the bottle and found
that it contained a dead, decomposing and putrefied mouse with
bits of fuzz floating about in the liquid. The plaintiff based his
cause of action on the breach of an implied warranty that the
beverage was fit for human consumption. The defendant argued
that no cause of action would lie for the breach of a warranty
when there existed no privity of contract between the parties.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals sustained the verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff saying:
Under modern conditions, when products of food or drink
have been prepared under the exclusive supervision of the
manufacturer and the consumer must take them as they are
supplied, the representations constitute an implied contract,
or implied warranty to the unknown and helpless consumer
that the article is good and wholesome and fit for use. If
privity of contract is required, then, under the situation and
circumstances of modern merchandise in such matters,
privity of contract exists in the consciousness and under-
standing of all right thinking persons. 8
The majority opinion relied heavily on Tomlinson v. Armour
25. 1 WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GooDs AT COMMON LAW
AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT 490 (2d ed. 1924).
26. See Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other than
Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937) (where the author
discusses the use of the unilateral contract theory, the third party bene-
ficiary theory, the theory of the assignment of the cause of action, and
the concept of a warranty running with the chattel as means of evading
the privity of contract requirement).
27. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App.
275, 90 S. W. 2d 445 (1936).
28. Id. at 283, 90 S. W. 2d at 450.
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and C0.29 and Mazetti v. Armour and Co.3 which support the
proposition that a manufacturer who sells goods in a sealed
package or container represents to each succeeding purchaser
that the contents thereof are suited to the purpose for which
they. are sold. Justice Bland, however, did not take this view,
and dissented as follows:
The decided weight of authority in this country is that a
suit of this character against a remote vendor cannot be
based upon a breach of an implied warranty but must be
upon negligence.... I quite agree with what was said in the
case of Davis v. Van Camp Packing Company [189 Iowa 775,
176 N. W. 382 (1920)] cited in the majority opinion, that
the highest degree of care is imposed upon the manufacturer
of an article for immediate human consumption and, in Nehi
Bottling Co. v. Thomas [236 Ky. 684, 33 S.W.2d 701 (1930)]
cited in the majority opinion, that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies, but hold, with the weight of authorities in
this country, that the suit cannot be brought upon the theory
of a breach of an implied warranty, there being no privity of
contract between the parties.21
Later in the same year, the same court came to the unanimous
conclusion that a remote vendor was not liable to a plaintiff who
had suffered injuries from eating deleterious canned salmon. 2
The grounds for distinguishing the two cases were not that one
involved a bottled beverage and the other a can of salmon, but
rather, that in the latter case the remote vendor had no oppor-
tunity for discovering what went into the cans as they were
packed for him by his vendor. Nevertheless, the court refuted
the argument of the defendant-retailer, who claimed that he
should not be held liable for defective food in a sealed package
because he had no opportunity to examine it, by adopting Willis-
ton's statement 3 that to so hold would revise the whole field of
warranty and put it on a basis of negligence. Query: What then
is the real basis for holding the remote vendor liable? A sub-
sequent decision by the St. Louis Court of Appeals"' follows the
29. 75 N. J. L. 748, 70 Atl. 314 (1908).
30. 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
31. Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Company, 230 Mo.
App. 275, 284, 90 S. W. 2d 445, 450 (1936); accord, Darke v. Scudder-
Gale Grocer Company, 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W. 430 (1910) (relied
on by the majority opinion but holds that "the action in this class of cases
is in tort, and not in contract.")
32. DeGouvera v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co. et al., 100 S. W. 2d 336
(Mo. 1936).
33. 1 WILLIsTON, op. cit. supra note 25, § 242.
34. McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S. W. 2d 849 (Mo. 1938).
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rule espoused in the Madouros case and allows a recovery for
injuries suffered as a result of foreign substances in a loaf of
bread. The court then also laid stress on the exclusive super-
vision of the defendant in the manufacture of the bread. This
case was held controlling in a subsequent decision where it was
held that the plaintiff need not allege a warranty if he stated
sufficient facts from which a warranty could be implied.3 5
In a recent Federal case"8 the court was confronted with the
problem of construing the Missouri law on the subject of implied
warranties. It was there held that the only warranty which
would be implied was one of fitness for a particular purpose and
not one of merchantability in general. Moreover, the court was
of the opinion that Missouri law would not extend the liability
of a manufacturer or vendor to a donee of a remote vendee. The
court also found just grounds for denying the cause of action
based on an implied warranty of merchantability in view of a re-
cent decision by the Missouri Supreme Court.3 7
CONCLUSIONS ON LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF
AN IMPLIED WARRANTY
The rule developed from the Madouros case makes it necessary
that the manufacturer or vendor have the exclusive control and
supervision over the production of the deleterious food product
before liability will attach for the breach of an implied war-
ranty. The Missouri appellate courts have also distinguished
between the liability of a remote vendor and the manufacturer
or immediate vendor$s The immediate vendor in privity of con-
tract with the plaintiff is held liable without regard to fault on
the grounds that to hold otherwise would revise the whole field
of warranty and place it on a basis of negligence. The remote
vendor, not in privity of contract with the plaintiff, is exempt
from liability unless he has had exclusive control over the pro-
cessing or manufacture of the product. Why this distinfction is
made, unless for the inference of possible negligence, is not clear.
It would seem that the law of warranty has, as a purely practical
matter, become in some manner related to the liability for neg-
35. Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S. W. 2d 1025 (Mo. 1940).
36. McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 85 F. Supp. 708
(W. D. Mo. 1949).
37. State ex Tel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 179 S. W. 2d 19 (Mo. 1944).
38. DeGouvera v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co. et al., 100 S. W. 2d 336
(Mo. 1936).
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ligence, and that before an action for the breach of an implied
warranty will lie against a remote vendor or manufacturers,
such defendants must have been in such a position as to allow
an inference of some negligent act. That such a fence straddling
proposition is unique goes without saying and it may be doubted
if the Supreme Court of Missouri would affirm such a holding29
As yet the problem has not come before the highest court of the
state.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
The first precedents affecting this field of law were established
over a century ago. At that time the shield of the law was
thrown over industry as a matter of practical expediency, en-
abling it to grow and prosper. The end has been accomplished.
It is time that the courts took judicial notice of this fact.
An eminent jurist once remarked that law which does not
make good sense is not good law. From that standpoint the law
of Missouri on this particular subject leaves a little to be desired.
Four suggestions for modification and improvement seem ap-
parent:
(1) The tort liability of a manufacturer should be predi-
cated on the basis of the foreseeable risk of harm instead of
on the characteristics of the chattel involved.
(2) Res ipsa loquitur should be applicable whenever the
defendant has had control of the instrumentality at the time
the alleged negligence of manufacture or testing occurred
without regard to the time when actual injury occurs.
(3) A remote vendor should be equally as liable as an
immediate vendor to avoid circuity of actions.
(4) The liability of a manufacturer or vendor for the
breach of an implied warranty should extend to the donee
of a remote vendee.
The first three suggested modifications need no further ex-
planation, but a final word may help to clarify the author's posi-
tion on the last one mentioned. As the case law of Missouri
stands today, a manufacturer is liable in tort to an innocent
bystander for injuries caused by a defective chattel (if it is
consider to be imminently dangerous) which has been negligently
39. See Overstreet, Some Aspects of implied Warranties in the Supreme
Court of Missouri, 10 Mo. L. Rzv. 147 (1945) (where the author discusses
the theory of the supreme court denying plaintiff recovery for injuries
suffered from a poisonous dye in a blouse which she had purchased from
the defendant because she had not purchased the blouse for any special
purpose, but only for the general purpose of wearing it.)
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